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I.) Introduction
Modernity, for Hannah Arendt, is primarily a matter of loss: authority, certainty, tradition,
and the possibility for meaningful action that can only occur in a public sphere in the full
view of equals. The modern age is coeval with the rise of society – the private realm of
“housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational devices,” 1 which has mixed with
the public so completely as to make them indistinguishable. The basic biological needs of
humanity, once relegated to the privacy of the household and deemed unworthy of true
political discussion, have become part and parcel with the political process as such.
Aristotle’s zoon politikon has become an animal laborans, bringing his labor into the
forefront of public discussion, indeed making it the topic for public discussion. This shift
has been made possible, in part, by the rise of reason, rationality, and science, a
development which considers man as part of a cosmic machine operating under universal
laws. The collection of equals that characterized the Greek polis has become a collection of
bureaucrats, placing their faith, as it were, in the dictums of statistics and “behavioral
sciences,” which “aim to reduce man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level of a
conditioned and behaving animal.” 2
It cannot be doubted that Franz Kafka is a modern writer. Something about the
“tremendous world I have inside my head” that Kafka related to us through his novels,
stories, and parables has managed to retain its resonance almost 100 years after their
composition. It is a world where man must bow his head, where tradition is inscribed with
a “sickness,” and the certainty allowed by appeals to a higher power – God, the King, the

1

Arendt, The Human Condition 38 (HC)

2

HC 45
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Platonic eidos –have crumbled under the onslaught of modernity: “Nowhere in Kafka does
there glimmer the aura of the infinite idea; nowhere does the horizon open.” 3 This is a
world we can experience in any number of everyday situations, from going to the DMV to
hearing physicists explain our world in terms of quarks and bosons, numbers and symbols.
It seems completely outside the realm of common human experience, completely irrational,
but we are told that this is the way it is, and we believe it because it seems like there can be
no alternative. The adjective for this kind of experience, “kafkaesque,” has entered common
parlance. Frederick Karl describes his conception of the word:
What's Kafkaesque is when you enter a surreal world in which all your
control patterns, all your plans, the whole way in which you have configured
your own behavior, begins to fall to pieces, when you find yourself against a
force that does not lend itself to the way you perceive the world. You don't
give up, you don't lie down and die. What you do is struggle against this with
all of your equipment, with whatever you have. But of course you don't stand
a chance. That's Kafkaesque.4
Arendt was no stranger to Kafka’s works. After coming to America to flee the Nazis,
she worked as an editor at Schocken Books, the imprint most responsible for exposing the
English‐speaking world to Kafka. She also wrote an essay on Kafka for The Partisan Review
in 1944, establishing herself as one of his earliest critics. The prologue to Between Past and
Future contains a detailed reading of Kafka’s parable “He.” She leads the final chapter in The
Human Condition with an aphorism from Kafka.

3
4

Adorno p. 246
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The extent of Kafka’s influence on Arendt’s conception of modernity is difficult to
pin down. Most of the existing scholarship focuses on her account of totalitarianism, and
places Kafka in the role of prophet, predicting real phenomena that wouldn’t occur until
after his death. In her only work focused exclusively on Kafka, Arendt deems him a builder
of “blueprints,” models that are “the product of thinking rather than of mere sense
experience.” 5 Kafka’s “unreality,” the sense in which his works clearly describe a world
that is not explicitly ours, “expose the naked structure of events” through the purely mental
activity of imagination. Kafka did not look around him and see the birth pangs of Hitler and
Stalin, but he did see the underlying conditions that would eventually lead to very real
atrocities, though he could not have known it at the time. Kafka’s vision, so to speak, was
exemplary for its ability to see the unseen and pass over blindly that which appeared most
readily. 6 His parables are organized around an “incident” like “rays of light which,
however, do not illuminate its outward appearance but possess the power of X rays to lay
bare its inner structure.” 7 This incident is the moment where past and future converge, the
individual moment of lived experience.
In her essay, Arendt attempts to read a kind of hope into the novels, a capacity for
resistance against a world that seeks to dispense with the human. She asserts that Kafka
“wanted to build up a world in accordance with human needs and human dignities, a world
where man’s actions are determined by himself and which is ruled by his laws and not by

Arendt, “Kafka: A Revaluation” pp. 76‐77. (KAR)
“The world of those realities that were important for him was invisible.” Max Brod, quoted in
Benjamin, p. 121
7 Between Past and Future, pp. 7 (BPAP)
5
6
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mysterious forces emanating from above or from below.” 8 This world is populated by
characters that are models of “the ‘common man’ as an ideal of humanity… the motor of his
activities is good will, in contrast to the motor of society with which he is at odds, which is
functionality.” 9 Arendt sees a kind of kindred spirit in Kafka, and wants to reconcile him
with her project, which explores the possibility for meaningful action in an age that always
seems to preclude it. Figures like Joseph K. in The Trial and K. in The Castle are exemplary,
in her analysis, for exposing the “naked structure” of modernity in all its shoddiness and
lack of feeling. They struggle against it in an attempt to bring about a more humane way of
living.
Arendt is famous for a prose style that has been described as “literary political
theory,” 10 or what she herself called simply “my old fashioned storytelling.” This
methodology encourages readers to form their own response to her empirical research,
taking into account a myriad of different vantage points that she lays out over the course of
a “story.” Part of her critique of modernity is the cessation of this openness, the sense that
in the modern world meaning is prescribed a priori as part of necessary processes beyond
our control, by a force that appeals to nothing and no one. History has become the progress
of “an inevitable superhuman law” 11 embodied by the workings of a machine in which
humans are caught. By emphasizing the human element of history, Arendt invites us, or
rather demands of us, to make judgments for ourselves. Rather than presenting her
accounts of modern phenomena as an objective report of the facts, Arendt discloses her

8
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own subjectivity and compels us to imagine (or recall) these phenomena as lived
experience. “She writes to move her audience to engage with her in thinking ‘what we are
doing.’” 12
This methodology makes it easier to account for her reading of Kafka, and its
potential faults. His works are made to fit into the story she is trying to tell, one that
articulates a fall brought about by the alienating effects of modernity. Arendt struggles
against this fall, and she reads Kafka as a figure engaged in the struggle. “He wanted to
build up a world in accordance with human needs and human dignities, a world where
man’s actions are determined by himself and which is ruled by his laws and not by
mysterious forces emanating from above or from below.” 13 This approach is useful for
thinking through Arendt’s program, but few critical statements could be more misleading
with regards to the Kafka text. One problem is bad data: she did not know that Amerika,
Kafka’s first and most optimistic novel, was actually his last and thus reads his work as a
progression from pessimism (The Trial and The Castle) to hope for a better world. Another
seems to be simple and willful misreading. Many critics before and after Arendt have tried
to read Kafka optimistically, but it is extremely dubious to claim that the world Kafka
“wanted to build up” has anything to do with greater human agency. Joseph K. is executed
without gaining a modicum of truth or meaning out of his whole experience. K. in The Castle
withers away of exhaustion after endless thwarted attempts to reach the titular fortress,
and is deprived the opportunity to live a “normal” life in this very strange village. All of

I owe this quote, and much of the thought laid out in the preceding paragraph, to Lisa Disch’s
essay “More Truth than Fact: Storytelling as Critical Understanding in the Writings of Hannah
Arendt”
13 KAR 80
12
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Kafka’s fiction ends in similarly morbid fashion, if it has anything that could be considered
an “ending” at all. 14
Like Arendt, Kafka is engaged in a struggle, but it is one with no clear goal. There is
no light at the end of the tunnel. As Walter Sokel notes, “Kafka, in writing, does not seem to
have a preconceived meaning, a fixed intention, in his mind.” 15 It seems Kafka wrote
simply because he had too, because it was the only thing that compelled him towards living
– not to the mention the fact that he was preternaturally gifted, to an almost absurd degree.
16

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that anyone in history has explored more intimately than

Kafka the question “why write?” An almost endless number of pages in his diary and letters
probe the meaning, the impetus for writing as such. On the one hand it was an
“impossibility,” 17 and on the other it was an absolute necessity. 18 We can, however, note
with only slight hesitance that he did not write to facilitate change, to diagnose an illness
that needed correction. He certainly observed the “sickness of tradition,” 19 but he saw it
with the eyes of someone immersed in a swamp without beginning or end; there is no cure.
While Arendt reads the Kafka “hero” as engaged in a struggle, the characters themselves all
recognize the futility of their efforts, the Sisyphean nature of their labor. Far from active
agents disclosing the possibility for new beginnings, for breaking out of the machine, the

The majority of Kafka’s extant work was unpublished in his lifetime, and mostly unedited. The
Trial, for instance, was a collection of fragments which Max Brod assembled as he saw fit.
15 Sokel pp. 33
16 He, of course, knew this very well: “Every sentence I write down is already perfect.”
17 “[The Jewish writers] live beset by three impossibilities: the impossibility of not writing, the
impossibility of writing in German and the impossibility of writing differently, and we could add a
fourth impossibility: the impossibility of writing at all.”
18 “My talent for portraying my dreamlike inner life has thrust all matters into the background; my
life has dwindled dreadfully, nor will it cease to dwindle. Nothing else will ever satisfy me.”
19 Benjamin pp. 143
14
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characters are swept up by the “angel of history,” who “turns his face to the past.” 20
If Arendt’s Kafka is, then, primarily useful for understanding Arendt, perhaps we
may use Arendt to better understand Kafka. I would like to do this by utilizing some of the
categories she explores in The Human Condition to show how both authors managed to
diagnose many of the same illnesses afflicting modernity, even if they did so by different
means and with different ends in mind. For Arendt this end was hope for the future, for a
thinking “without bannisters,” for new possibilities of action. As for Kafka, I would like to
reference Walter Benjamin’s letter to Gerhard Scholem in 1938, in which he makes a very
strange claim:
To do justice to the figure of Kafka in its purity and its peculiar beauty one
must never lose sight of one thing: it is the purity and beauty of a failure. The
circumstances of this failure are manifold. One is tempted to say: once he was
certain of eventual failure, everything worked out for him en route as in a
dream. 21
Failure, in the Benjaminian analysis, is Kafka’s end, the eventual telos of his whole writing
project. This is an incredibly contentious statement, and one not widely shared by
Benjamin’s critical descendants. 22 I would like to argue that he is actually more faithful to
the Kafka text than any of the more optimistic critics who followed. Failure is built into his
stories in a way that is fundamental to their unfolding in time. If the stories work towards
something, it is the realization that they have actually been working backwards or treading

Benjamin quoted in KAR 75. More on this concept in Part 3.
Benjamin pp. 144‐45
22 For Deleuze and Guattari’s response to Benjamin’s “failure,” see Laura Penny’s “Parables and
Politics: How Benjamin and Deleuze & Guattari Read Kafka”
20
21

10
water just to stay in place. Kafka’s world is, in Benjamin’s terms, a “swamp world.” 23 The
“infinite idea” is already recognized as impossible, but the desire for it always remains. This
is the way everything “works out” for him “en route as in a dream.” That this desire must
end in failure leads to a kind of negative revelation, “a negative achievement, a negative
elimination of all significant difference between consciousness and existence.” 24
By reading Kafka through an Arendtian lens, and keeping this reading duly situated
within the Benjaminian teleology of failure, I think we can gain some new insights into the
way modernity functions in his stories. While Arendt herself might have been a little
disappointed in the pessimism such an analysis will inevitably entail, what it lacks in
optimism will hopefully be made up for in faithfulness to the figure of Kafka. We must
always remember that this is the man who said “there is hope – an infinite amount of hope
– but not for us.”

I will focus on two of Kafka’s stories here, “The Burrow” and “The Great Wall of China.” The
narrators of both stories analyze a building process; the kind of structure attempted, the
reasons for building, and the ways each project constitute the subjects involved. I choose
these stories because the process of building provides a good context for connecting Kafka
to Arendt’s categories of the vita activa. The kind of labor involved in building them, the
specific spaces they enclose, and the ambiguous goals of both projects are very modern, in
that they are critiqued through a scientific/logical framework and situated within a world

23
24

Benjamin p. 130
Thorlby pp. 80
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where all certainty has disappeared. Both invoke Kant’s dictum “Sapere aude!” 25 and both
ultimately run up against a point where the dictum fails. For the burrower, it is the
intrusion of a mysterious “whistling” with no discernible position in space, an intrusion
that eventually leads to the collapse of his world. All his efforts to discover the nature of
this phenomenon fail. For the narrator of “The Great Wall,” it is the existence of a “high
command,” infinitely distant from the people it rules over. The Chinese people have a
maxim: “Try with all your might to comprehend the decrees of the high command, but only
up to a certain point; then avoid further meditation.” 26 These characters are, in a sense,
caught up in the “machinery” of Enlightenment rationality, but they cannot use it to their
advantage, much less understand it. I will return to this notion when I discuss the
“Archimedean point,” the privileged outside vantage from which one can see everything as
a whole and understand it.
For all the thematic similarities, the differences in the two stories are probably more
illuminating. “The Burrow” is narrated by an asocial, solipsistic animal‐human hybrid
concerned only with himself and his creation. “The Great Wall,” on the other hand, involves
an entire empire, and its narrator is concerned with the workings of a multitude. By putting
the stories into a dialogue, we can gain some insight into Arendt’s conception of humanity
as a plurality: “… the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.” 27 For
Arendt this is the condition of action, “the only activity that goes on directly between men
and without the intermediary of things or matter.” By presenting the individual as a being
driven partially by animal instincts and partially by man’s rationality, as opposed to the

Kant
Kafka, The Complete Stories 240 (KCS)
27 HC 7
25
26
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population of an empire which is depicted as a kind of abstract totality, Kafka shows two
different ways to think through the vita activa in the modern age, specifically in terms of
the public and private. Arendt analyzes the public sphere as the space wherein the
individual, freed from the conditions of necessity, may engage in politics and create
something new; for Kafka as for Arendt, the conflation of public and private dismisses the
individual and subjects him to the same processes of historical necessity as the population.
This conflation is the “social” sphere of human existence – “the rise of housekeeping, its
activities, problems, and organizational devices.” 28 The only way out of this modern
“machinery” appears to be the dream, attained in moments of inaction, pointing towards
the impossible. The dream, in Adorno’s words, “confirm[s] the reality of everything else,
even if it should be that dream reality suggested periodically by passages… so agonizingly
drawn out they leave the reader gasping for air.” 29

II.) Public, Private, Social
For Arendt, the rise of the social is the condition of modernity, the element that most
singularly distinguishes it from tradition. 30 In antiquity the public and private realms were
sharply delineated by several factors: the kind of activity permitted, the type of subject
allowed to participate, and the particular physical space that marked the proper domain of
each. The private realm was bound to the processes of necessity, the daily cares in which

HC 38
Adorno 248. Adorno is specifically referencing The Castle and Amerika here, but I think the
statement holds true for Kafka’s work as a whole.
30 “The emergence of the social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a
relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age and
which found its political form in the nation‐state.” HC 28
28
29
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each human being must labor in order to survive. Matters of economics and individual
prosperity – material interests ‐ were also reserved for the private because they are driven
by “wants and needs,” 31 and do nothing for the higher categories of activity which can only
be undertaken once purely biological motives have been taken care of. This is why slaves
were so crucial to the functioning of both the polis and the Roman city‐state; they allowed
the citizen to shrug necessity and join his equals in politics, philosophy, and the arts.
“Everything merely necessary or useful is strictly excluded.” 32 The higher activities were
not only proper to the public sphere, they were the very definition of public. Equally
important was the presence of others with whom one could engage on equal footing. The
private realm of the household might was the “center of strictest inequality,” 33 and even
the master of the house was not free when he was in it because he was still burdened with
the command of others.
Every activity performed in public can attain an excellence never matched in
privacy; for excellence, by definition, the presence of others is always
required, and this presence needs the formality of the public, constituted of
one’s peers, it cannot be the casual, familiar presence of one’s equals or
inferiors. 34
The rise of the social marked the spilling over of the private into the public, and a
complete reconstitution of the organizational principles that govern and define the latter.
For the ancients this structural transformation would have been unfathomable.

Arendt notes that in antiquity even slaves could amass a respectable fortune, but this offered
little consolation for their exclusion from the public sphere. HC 59
32 HC 25
33 HC 32
34 HC 49
31
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Participation in the public sphere was practically the whole meaning of existence, and to
sully the kind of activity that it alone permitted, by freeing the tedium and banality of the
household from its confines, would have seemed utterly absurd. We will discuss some of
the causes for such a transformation later, but for now we need only concern ourselves
with its effects.
By conflating the private and public, humanity began to consider itself en masse as a
kind of conditioned animal, a population rather than a plurality. The “phenomenon of
conformism” became the impetus for the concurrent rise of the social sciences, which are
possible only insofar as men “unanimously followed certain patterns of behavior, so that
those who did not keep the rules could be considered to be asocial or abnormal.” 35 The
“rules” spread to cover larger and larger swaths of people and space, aiming to assimilate
everyone into a certain predictability. Perhaps most emblematic of this statistical
predilection was the development of economics, which has had profound impacts on the
organization of society. 36 Labor, the necessary activity of sustaining life (which we will
discuss further in the next part of this essay), was liberated from the private realm and
given singular importance in the public discourse, and the security of it’s handmaiden
property – “the labour of our body and the work of our hands,” in Locke’s terms ‐ 37 became
the overriding concern of politics. “Originally,” Arendt notes, “property meant no more or
less than to have one’s location in a particular part of the world and therefore to belong to

HC 42
Even the term, “organization of society,” already speaks volumes to the kind of change Arendt is
articulating.
37 HC 111
35
36
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the body politic…” 38 Only with the rise of the social did the interior of this private domain
and its attendant concept of ownership become a matter for legislation and intervention in
the public. 39
The impact of humankind’s socialization is stamped all over the work of Kafka. The
depth of his insight into the ways that it shapes and confounds the individual is one his
most scrutinized (and celebrated) contributions to modern literature. To see the effects of
this, we need look no further than the “hero” of The Trial, Joseph K., consumed and
destroyed by “a great organization… which not only employs corrupt wardens, stupid
inspectors, and examining magistrates… but also has at its disposal a judicial hierarchy of
high, indeed the highest, rank, with an indispensible retinue of servants, clerks, police and
other assistants, perhaps even hangmen.” 40 Men defined by jobs, endless hierarchies which
obey arbitrary laws, hawk‐eyed attention paid to private activities and desires, the
inexorable progression of processes which seem completely outside human control.
Totalitarianism, the most atrocious example of socialization taken to its extreme, appears
latent in Kafka’s worldview, as Arendt herself asserts in “A Revaluation.” 41 Moreover, the
effects of modern processes like capitalism and self‐alienation achieve expression in stories
like “The Metamorphosis” that are the non plus ultra of modern human experience, giving
voice to “socially forbidden feelings and thoughts,” while also revealing a “censoring,
concealing, and thus repressive side that made the rebellion they tried to express
HC 61
An important part of Arendt’s analysis, which we will not delve into here, consists of the rise of
so‐called “market forces” and the commodification of almost everything that can be produced. I
leave this out mainly because it is far too large a topic for the scope of the present investigation, and
also because the two Kafka stories I’ve chosen have relatively little to do with exchange,
productivity, and other concepts related to capital.
40 Quoted in KAR 70
41 For an analysis of Kafka’s influence on The Origins of Totalitarianism, see Danoff
38
39
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unrecognizable to consciousness.” 42 Arendt is quite right when she notes
Only the reader for whom life and the world and man are so complicated, of
such terrible interest, that he wants to find out some truth about them and
who therefore turns to story tellers for insight into experiences common to
us all may turn to Kafka…” 43
“The Great Wall of China” provides a different perspective on the relationship
between public, private and social. The story has the form of a “report,” an analysis of
structures and conditions rather than a narrative relation of events unfolding over linear
time. We know that the narrator himself has a particular vantage, a village in the southeast
of China, and has only anecdotal knowledge of much of the surrounding country. He has
traveled some, but the expanse of the empire is so large as to be practically infinite, and so
his knowledge is limited. Asserting the impossibility of contact with “the northerners,” he
claims that “the land is too vast and would not let them reach us, they would end their
course in the empty air.” 44 Despite this apparent spatial restriction, the influence of China’s
leaders is omnipresent in all corners of life. “Our leaders know us,” he says, “They,
absorbed in gigantic anxieties, know of us, know our petty pursuits, see us sitting together
in our humble huts, and approve or disapprove the evening prayer which the father of the
house recites in the midst of his family.” 45 The image of Bentham’s panopticon, so often
invoked in Kafka criticism, seems inescapable here. The prying eye, peering into the
confines of humanity’s most private experiences, passing judgment that can neither be

Sokel 17
KAR 77
44 KCS 241
45 KCS 241
42
43
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confirmed nor denied. The “anxieties” of the leaders underscores the sense that the source
of judgment is neither the austere, unquestionable deity of the Christian tradition nor the
collection of high‐minded equals that constituted the polis. These leaders are subject to the
same worries as their subjects ‐ only made “gigantic” ‐ and eminently concerned with the
“petty pursuits” which make up the activities of the private realm; they are Gods fashioned
in man’s image, but this a particular kind of socialized man who thinks primarily of daily
needs, quotidian cares, and reflects these thoughts back onto the organizing principle of his
own life. “Kafka depicted a society which had established itself as a substitute for God,”
Arendt writes, “and he described men who looked upon the laws of society as though they
were divine laws – unchangeable through the will of men.” 46 Divinity, the
unquestionability of an authority handed down from on high, requires obscurity. “The most
obscure of our institutions is that of the empire itself,” 47 the narrator says, and he
emphasizes over and over again the extent to which the Chinese people cannot even be
sure that their Emperor exists. 48 The opacity of the leaders, the absolute impossibility of
engagement with them in any form, precludes any form of resistance, any chance at
rebellion. The diffuseness of the leadership presence makes their influence a matter of
internalization, a deep‐seeded infection that spreads outward exponentially like a virus.
Everyone in China is susceptible to it because the belief in its validity is so crucial to their
sense of national identity, the binding agent that prevents individuals from foundering in a

KAR 72
KCS 242
48 Additionally, the reader remains unsure who exactly is in charge here. The high command, the
Emperor, and “nature Gods” are all considered separately, and therefore must be distinct entities.
This ambiguity emphasizes the extent to which the gaze of authority extends into every facet of
private life, and permits nothing in terms of reciprocality.
46
47
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sea of uncertainty.
Arendt writes that “the phenomenon of conformism is characteristic of the last stage
of this modern development,” 49 and we can see the ways this plays out as necessity in “The
Great Wall.” The conflation of the public and private, the sense in which there is no space in
which the eyes of the leadership do not pry, fosters the conformity of the Chinese people.
But the innate desire of humankind to bind itself to a coherent worldview is not enough in
itself to ensure that fragmentation does not occur; there is always a material, private
concern that overrides all others. The rise of society is, after all, not merely predicated on
an abstract ideal that proceeds with or without specific kinds of organization; socialization
requires reification in order to become dominant. In “The Great Wall,” the building of the
wall provides the concrete structure that makes tangible the rather mystical scope of the
empire. In case there is any doubt as to the codependence of the empire and the wall, the
narrator makes it explicit: “Far rather do I believe that the high command has existed from
all eternity, and the decision to build the wall likewise.” 50 By giving the wall and its
conceivers an eternal quality, the whole process of socialization that the wall engenders
appears to progress inevitably, as a kind of dialectic. 51 Moreover, the high command
elevates the craft of masonry “as the most important branch of knowledge throughout the
whole area of China,” 52 ensuring that reification of conformity attends to the same desires
as the abstract ideals which will belief in the leaders’ eternal path of inevitability.

HC 40
KCS 242
51 Considered as a dialectic movement, it is interesting that the story begins with an assertion of
completion; as if the dialectical synthesis had been achieved. However, as we shall see, the wall is
never really “finished.” They still have to build the Tower of Babel.
52 KCS 236
49
50
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Education, the system by which a population learns norms and values, prioritizes the wall
to the exclusion of all else; including, we might assume, the critical faculties that would
undermine the legitimacy of the wall and the high command. Here we have a kind of
mockery of the pursuit of excellence found in the public sphere, carefully directed and
promoted by anxious Gods who think only in terms of the private, and “see the body of
peoples and political communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to
be taken care of by a gigantic, nation‐wide administration of housekeeping.” 53
If “The Great Wall of China” provides a compelling example of socialization at work,
“The Burrow” seems to be its opposite. The burrower is fiercely individualistic, non‐
conformist, and asocial – the opposite of the Chinese wall‐builder who goes about his task
with the weight of the nation, “a current of blood no longer confined within the narrow
circulation of one body, but sweetly rolling and yet ever returning throughout the endless
leagues of China.” 54 The burrower’s structure is designed to seclude its subject from
society, not to integrate it. He also wishes to mix his blood with his building – “I was glad
when the blood came, for that was a proof that the walls were beginning to harden” 55‐ but
works at every moment to assure it is only his blood that seeps into the structure. Privacy
and solitude are panaceas for all that ails him. He appeals to no God‐like authorities, and
constantly rebels against the natural conditions given to him. In many respects he seems to
be the “deviation” which social science fails to account for. But this is misleading. The
burrower is, in fact, just as conditioned by the strictures of society as any Chinese laborer.
To get to how this is so, we must first examine his place in Arendt’s delineations.

HC 28
KCS 238
55 KCS 328
53
54
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Everything the burrower does is intensely private. As Hermann Weigand notes, “he thinks
of nothing but himself and his burrow,” 56 directing all of his inquiries back towards his
myopic focus on privacy, security and “self‐glorification.” Even the self and its creation are
integrated; Heinz Politzer writes: “Literally the creation harbors the creator; moreover, it
swallows him up to such an extent that he himself is denied any identification.” 57 The
narrator’s creation is an integral part of him rather than a passive object, an extension of
his psyche rather than something that psyche reflects upon. In this analysis, the burrow is
not something the narrator can observe or appreciate, or rather only to the extent that the
self can observe or appreciate itself; it is himself that he watches, and himself that he gloats
over in his obsessive and pedantic commentary. “What do I care for danger now that I am
with you,” he says, addressing the burrow directly, “You belong to me, I to you, we are
united, what can harm us?” 58 The burrow, then, is an extension of the burrower’s body, the
place where the most private processes imaginable occur; digestion, reproduction,
defecation, etc. 59 As such, the life of the burrower/burrow follows the same logic as the
progression of the biological process. The burrow is not something the burrower merely
uses to facilitate a more comfortable life or a life freed from the cares of necessity; by
identifying himself with his burrow to such a great extent, the use‐value of the burrow as
an object becomes a tied directly to the life‐process which consumes itself continuously in
order to exist. Thus the burrow must remain forever in media res, lest its completion bring
about an end to the process that sustains its creator, just as labor is necessary to sustain
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human life. As in “The Great Wall,” our narrator begins his story with an assertion of this
completion, and in the end the cessation of the process brings about his self‐destruction
through the mysterious “whistling,” which severs the progression of life and plants him a
present with no future. After indeterminate time spent trying to ascertain the cause of the
whistling, and the commencement of “experiments” which only disfigure the burrow
because they lack the dialectical force which propelled all previous efforts, 60 the burrower
can only hunker down in his Castle Keep, “choose a lovely piece of flayed red flesh and
creep with it into one of the heaps of the earth; there I shall have silence at least, such
silence, at any rate, as still can be said to exist here.” 61
What relevance can this strange animal and his obsessive attraction to his home
have for the human in modern conditions? For one, it shows the disintegration of the
private realm in the modern world. In antiquity the private existed as a counterpart of the
public, enabling the transition that was necessary for a man to shed his familial
responsibilities and take on the public duties of the citizen. If we saw in “The Great Wall”
how the conflation of public and private can lead to an omnipresent authority that seems
unassailable, here we witness what happens when the public disappears altogether and the
only recourse left for an individual is located in the private activities. This does not
diminish the desire for the benefits which the public sphere afforded, however; they are
merely disfigured by the absence of a proper place for expression. The disintegration of the
private is not an idiosyncrasy of Kafka’s strange dream‐world. It is the outcome of a certain
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set of conditions, ways of thinking and acting that only emerge in the socialized world of
modernity.
For Arendt only an animal can live a truly private life, “deprived of the reality that
comes from being seen and heard by others… deprived of an ‘objective’ relationship with
them that comes from being related to and separated from them through the intermediary
of a common world of things… deprived of the possibility of achieving something more
permanent than life itself.” 62 For our burrower, who has no apparent interest in interacting
with anyone or engaging in any kind of common space, the self‐glorification which he so
assiduously craves finds its object in the burrow, with himself as the observer reveling in
the structure which he identifies so deeply with – “.. it is as if I were not so much looking at
my house as at myself sleeping, and had the joy of being in a profound slumber and
simultaneously of keeping vigilant guard over myself.” 63 The role of the other in the public
sphere is excluded, and the necessary condition of humanity – being amongst others – is
relocated to the space of fantasy, the dream of doing away with others and yet still
achieving the “joy” of observing the self and its self‐aggrandizing objects. The way Kafka
mixes the natural cares of the animal – food, security, safety – and the “higher” aims of the
human creates a strange dysfunction, a cancelling‐out of the public and private that leads to
nothing but endless anxiety and fear (as well as small moments of fleeting joy).
Arendt notes the “modern discovery of intimacy seems a flight from the whole outer
world into the inner subjectivity of the individual , which formerly had been sheltered and
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protected by the private realm.” 64 “Thus modern property,” she writes later, “lost its
worldly character and was located in the person himself, that is, in what an individual could
lose only along with his life.” 65 The burrower makes clear that losing his property is
analogous to, if not worse than, losing his life. His ceaseless watching from above, his
temporary wish to flee the spot forever rather than expose it to his enemies, indeed all of
his activities once he has decamped from the interior illustrate his very bodily and
biological connection to the burrow. It is as if he considers himself as an appendage of the
burrow, one that must be amputated if necessary in order to maintain the health of the
larger body. To consider one’s home in this way is only possible when the private sphere is
the last recourse and all possibility of movement is cut off; in short, when the public sphere
has disappeared and the private becomes the totality of the world.
This does not rule out the presence of others; it only restricts their particular
constitution from the subjective perspective. There are some “others” in “The Burrow,” and
they characteristically take the outward form of predators and bandits. During his short
lived hunting excursion to the topside, the burrower observes the activity going on near the
entrance:
Here enemies are numerous and their allies and accomplices still more
numerous, but they fight one another, and while thus employed rush past my
burrow without noticing it. In all my time I have never seen anyone
investigating the actual door of my house, which is fortunate both for me and
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for him, for I would certainly have launched myself at his throat, forgetting
everything else in my anxiety for the burrow. 66
These “enemies” show no interest in the burrow, not here nor anywhere else over the
course of the narrative. Their enmity is entirely constructed from imagination. 67 The
burrower relates an incident that occurred in his youth, when he was “nothing more than a
humble apprentice,” 68 in which he hears a noise from outside the burrow that resembles
his own laboring sounds. In this early stage of his life, the other is merely a source of
curiosity; the potential for public engagement has not yet closed entirely. “I probably would
not have been displeased to see the burrower suddenly rising from the ground…” 69 It is
clear that as the building of the burrow progresses, and it gets closer to the ideal burrow
that its creator has in his mind, the concept of privacy grow in importance until it becomes
all‐consuming, as if the burrower becomes more aware of his own body and thus more
aware of its mortal vulnerability. Instead of overcoming this existential anxiety by
transcending his “life=span into past and future,” 70 i.e. by entering the commons, he
follows the historical progression of socialization and turns inward.
Of course we must remember that he is an animal, not a human, and subject to
different kinds of interrelational criteria than, say, the citizens of China. 71 But part of the
mystique of Kafka’s animal stories is that they seem familiar, constantly compelling the
KCS 334
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reaction “’that’s the way it is,’ and with it the question, “’where have I seen that before?’” 72
despite their non‐human subjects. Arendt describes how the disappearance of the private
life (“The Great Wall of China”) or the private life itself (“The Burrow”) has forced the Kafka
character “into abandoning all human traits and into fulfilling his function as though he
were inhuman.” 73 For both Arendt and Kafka this is a loss, something the former makes
explicit and the latter alludes to through oblique desires. In “The Great Wall” the Chinese
express the desire to touch the emperor, to feel his presence in their lives in a tangible way:
…there is also involved a certain feebleness of faith and imaginative power
on the part of the people, that prevents them from raising the empire out of
its stagnation in Peking and clasping it in all its palatable living reality to
their own breasts, which yet desire nothing better than but once to feel that
touch and then to die. 74
This weakness is one of the “greatest unifying influences” on the Chinese people, the “very
ground on which we live.” The sense is that to see the Empire as a human institution would
destroy the very foundations of its organization. The wall reifies the empire by closing it in
and uniting the people in a common labor, but its immensity, the infinite scope of it
reaching beyond all human understanding, is a necessary condition for the population. The
establishment of a public sphere is precluded by this immensity, by the privacy of their
desire to feel the body of the leader, by the conformism engendered by their unwavering
faith in this incorporeal idea. The narrator’s emphasis on “the ground” reinforces the
notion that the very constitution of reality relies on the empire for coherence, depriving the
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Chinese of their own ground, their own private space. 75 They have lost their basic
humanity by becoming dependent and forsaking their agency to act in the world.
The most important point in this discussion of public and private, from the
Arendtian point of view, is the requirement that both spheres co‐exist simultaneously for
either to have any real distinction. The rise of the social is the blurring of the lines that
separate them, their conflation under conditions that destroy the sanctity of each and bring
them under a single, infinitely controllable realm. “The Burrow” and “The Great Wall”
describe this process in two very different ways and from two very different perspectives,
but the outcome is essentially the same: the social subject cannot act in any real sense. The
Chinese people are ruled by a disembodied authority that cannot be known. The burrower
is similarly ruled by an unknowable authority, but it is a force located within himself,
predicated by animal instinctiveness mixed with a human penchant for self‐glorification.
The point is that both act in accordance with a certain inevitability that closes off the
prospect for something new. “…I know that my term is measured, that I do not have to hunt
here forever, and that, whenever I am weary of this life and wish to leave it, Someone,
whose invitation I shall not be able to withstand, will, so to speak, summon me to him.” 76

III.) Labor and Work
In The Human Condition Arendt moves from considering the spaces of human
activity and their transformation under the social to the activities themselves. The first two
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categories of the vita activa are work and labor. 77 She admits that making a distinction
between these two concepts is “unusual,” as not even Marx saw fit to draw this line.
Nevertheless, Arendt claims that the distinction is crucial to understanding human activity,
and cites the fact that every European language contains two separate terms for these
activities, “and retains them in the face of their persistent synonymous usage.” 78
As she provides short definitions for both concepts at the beginning of the book, I
will quote her at length:
Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the
human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay
are bound to the vital necessities produced and into the life process by labor.
The human condition of labor is life itself.
Work is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human
existence, which is not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated
by, the species’ ever‐recurring life cycle. Work provides an “artificial” world
of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings. Within its
borders each individual life is housed, while this world itself is meant to
outlast and transcend them all. The human condition of work is worldliness.
79

Labor is repetitive and never‐ending, concerned solely with biological processes
that humans share with animals. In Arendt’s view, a beaver constructing a dam or a
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squirrel gathering nuts for the winter are both activities that fall under the category of
labor, as befits the operative term denoting the subject of labor, the animal laborans. Slaves
are also animals laborans, excluded from the political realm which is the only arena in
which citizenship and meaningful speech are possible, and hence the only one in which
someone can be truly human. 80 It is the presence of others, the single being’s place in
plural mankind that defines humanity, and “the activity of labor does not need the presence
of others.” 81 The products of labor are immediately consumed and leave no trace on the
world, and thereby have no effect on humanity as a whole.
This is not to say that labor is necessarily a solitary activity. Marx, after all, spent his
entire life trying to establish labor as the essential condition of humankind, the thread that
ties us all together. 82 Arendt acknowledges that labor is absolutely necessary; it is the
elevation of labor into a privileged position in the hierarchy of activity 83, its entrance into
the hallowed sphere of the public, that she (in opposition to Marx) seems to decry. “The
rather uncomfortable truth of the matter is that the triumph the modern world has
achieved over necessity is due to the emancipation of labor, that is, to the fact that the
animal laborans was permitted to occupy the public realm.” This “uncomfortable” triumph
has effectively eliminated the public sphere as a space of action, degrading it from the
collection of equals engaged in political activity ‐ like that of the Greeks ‐ into a kind of
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bedroom with no walls, with “private activities displayed in the open.” 84 The ascension of
labor has enabled “socialized mankind,” the “reversal of all traditions” which characterizes
modernity. 85 While all humans and animals may require labor power to enable life and the
survival of the species, this requirement is only the barest minimum for life to exist.
Humanity needs more than this to distinguish itself from animals and to create a history for
itself that endures beyond the single life.
Part of this need is fulfilled by work, which provides durability by means of
fabrication: “homo faber who makes and literally ‘works upon’ as distinguished from the
animal laborans which labors and ‘mixes with.’” 86 This durability is not everlasting. We use
the products that work creates, and this use eventually causes decay, a return to “the over‐
all natural process from which they were drawn and against which they were created.” But
by adding an element of temporal longevity to the human artifice, mankind can achieve an
approximation of the Platonic Idea, the fantastic model towards which an object’s creator
strives. While the product of work is as subject to the inevitable processes of decay as the
product of labor, the model itself survives and ensures permanence. A chair may crumble
back into bits of wood, but chairs in general remain viable, regardless of the biological
existence of the builder. This enables a stable context that delineates man from nature,
providing a “man‐made world of things… a home for mortal men, whose stability will
endure and outlast the ever‐changing moment of their lives and actions.” 87 This is what
Arendt means by “worldliness.”
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The products of homo faber are use products, designed and crafted with a specific
end in mind. The end justifies the means which are used to achieve it. For example, the
chair justifies carving the wood and the wood justifies killing the tree. 88 “During the work
process, everything is judged in terms of suitability and usefulness for the desired end, and
for nothing else.” As Arendt notes, the means‐ends relationship creates a ceaseless chain,
one where each product must lead to another, more refined product. Thus there is actually
no ultimate end and hence no way to justify the means in the first place.
For an end, once it is attained, ceases to be an end and loses its capacity to
guide and justify the choice of means, to organize and produce them. It has
now become an object among objects, that is, it has been added to the huge
arsenal of the given from which homo faber selects freely his means to
pursue his ends. 89
In other words, once the work process stops, the fruits of the process no longer bear the
finality of an end. They are absorbed back into the process itself and become the means to
something else, some further end. The chair, for example, must provide a more comfortable
manner of sitting, or be sold for profit after it is finished in order to fit into the category
“chair” and not be just an arbitrarily nailed‐together collection of lumber. The only way out
of the endless chain is to invoke the Kantian “means‐in‐itself,” which amounts to tautology
when we are talking about utility. 90
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Art on the other hand, which has a strained relationship to both work and labor, is
created without any intention of usefulness, making it more durable than the products of
homo faber. The creation of art partakes of work through reification ‐ like use products ‐ by
hands which transform the idea into a tangible objects: poems, paintings, sculptures, etc.
Art springs from feeling, which is transformed into thought, which can then become things
and enter the world. As opposed to “cognition” and “science,” thought “has neither an end
nor an aim outside itself, and it does not even produce results.” 91 The physicist, whose
mental process is cognition, searches for a solution to a particular problem, and once that
solution is found the problem is dissolved. The means and ends are quite clear and distinct.
For the artist, whose particular problems are as insoluble as the “question for the meaning
of life,” 92 the process is not so simple.
Kafka reveals the strangeness of his conception of means and ends, labor and work,
in a diary entry, in which he describes a wish to “attain a view of life (and – this was
necessarily bound up with it – to convince others of it in writing), in which life, while still
retaining its natural full‐bodied rise and fall, would simultaneously be recognized no less
clearly as a nothing, a dream, a dim hovering.” 93 He explicates this wish by way of analogy:
…as if one were to hammer together a table with painful and methodical
technical efficiency, and simultaneously do nothing at all, and not in such a
way that people could say: “Hammering a table together is nothing to him,”
but rather: “Hammering a table together is really hammering a table together
to him, but at the same time it is nothing,” whereby certainly the hammering
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would have become still bolder, still surer, still more real and, if you will, still
more senseless. 94
On the one hand we have a textbook example of the work process, “painful and
methodical,” moving towards a useful end, that is a finished table. Yet this process is also a
“nothing.” What could it possibly mean to build a table and also to do nothing? Common
sense implies the end as built into the formulation as table‐building, leading to a very clear
and established purpose. By emphasizing the co‐existence of this normal way of thinking –
“Hammering a table together is really hammering a table together” – and the ongoing
process of nothingness, the “senselessness” of the end is made clear. The table is real, yet it
means nothing, because it is not an end‐in‐itself and reveals itself in utilitarian terms to be
just another endless process. In effect, Kafka wishes to have his cake and eat it too. And
further, by using this analogy to illustrate a wish for a particular “view of life,” with its
“natural full‐bodied rise and fall,” the convergence of the work process and the life process
manifests the patent absurdity of ascribing a meaning to life, no less than to ascribe a
meaning to work. It is this lack of meaning, this lack of sense, that makes the entire process
real and worthwhile, or at least sustainable. One could say that, for Kafka, this is the entire
raison d’être of the work of art. The work of art is as much a labor ‐ in that it has no
meaning besides the sustenance of life itself and is consumed by the artist as part of this
“full‐bodied” life process ‐ as a work, in that it aims toward a reified object with a use but
no sense. Kafka’s way out of the means and ends chain is to deny that the end exists at all,
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at least as something attainable. The object of work qua art is a “dream, a dim hovering.”
This dream points towards something impossible: “It is entirely conceivable that life’s
splendor forever lies in wait about each of us in all its fullness, but veiled from view, deep
down, invisible, far off.” 95
Kafka makes sure to note, immediately following the expression of this desire, that
“he could not wish in this fashion, for his wish was not a wish, but only a vindication of
nothingness…” 96 The world of Kafka’s stories is not this fantasy of table‐building and
doing‐nothing co‐existing; while I must confess I’m not sure what that kind of world would
look like, we can be certain that the Kafka character inhabits a world in which every
process results in a something, even if that something is unfathomable. As we have
established, these characters live in a socialized world, and it is only in this kind of world
that Kafka can express the inevitable failure of this wish. In the modern world there is no
way out of the means‐ends chain that socialization entails.
For the ancients, in Arendt’s analysis, the products of work would have only
ancillary connection to the activities of animal laborans, because the former exists in a
world, whereas the latter has no world besides the one located in the individual body.
While it is true that the homo faber has to eat (and thus labor), this necessity can be
satisfied either by leaving the realm of work and temporarily becoming an animal laborans,
or by having slaves; the important thing is that the homo faber’s products are not
immediately consumed. “The man‐made world of things, the human artifice erected by
homo faber, becomes a home for mortal men, whose stability will endure and outlast the
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ever‐changing movement of their lives and actions…” 97 The onset of socialization, with its
unequivocal emphasis on use‐value and its conflation of public and private, brings with it
the subsumption of work into labor and the alienation of humankind from itself and the
products of its work. Everything is evaluated according to its use (including labor and thus
human life), and everything which achieves its end is consumed by something else.
In an essay on “The Metamorphosis,” Walter Sokel defines “self‐alienation” as “the
individual’s estrangement from his humanity or ‘human species being,’ i.e., from the
individual’s membership in the human species. The individual is estranged from himself
insofar as he is alienated from his essential nature as a human being.” 98 In Arendtian
terms, Sokel is describing “loss of the world.” In order to overcome self‐alienation, in the
Marxist view, work must not be “dictated by external needs or the commands of others,”
but “chosen, partially at least, for its intrinsic pleasure.” Only in this way can work be an
end‐in‐itself and not a means for something else, and thus man can realize his humanity
through his own free will. It is characteristic of modernity that the possibility for this kind
of free labor is excluded, a fact Sokel sees exemplified in Gregor Samsa’s activities – always
“externalized,” always belonging to someone else. 99
We can also see the manifestation of self‐alienation in “The Great Wall of China.” The
primary cause of this is the wall’s “piecemeal construction”; the importance of this method
in the building process is so great the narrator calls it “one of the crucial problems in the
whole building of the wall… If I am to convey and make understandable the ideas and
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feelings of that time I cannot go deeply enough into this very question.” 100 The narrator
begins his report by noting that the piecemeal construction in many ways defeats the
purpose of the wall itself. The goal is ostensibly for it to “be a protection against the peoples
of the north,” which raises the question “how can a wall protect if it is not a continuous
structure?” 101 As the narrator notes, the enemies of China have a better view of the
construction than the builders themselves, and tear down the sections faster than they can
go up. The answer to this conundrum, of course, is that the wall is not designed for
protection at all. Its real purpose is the mobilization of “two great armies of labor,” which
are divided into smaller groups of twenty and transferred to all corners of the empire
whenever they’ve finished their five‐hundred yard sections. Furthermore, the “more purely
manual tasks” are undertaken by “ignorant day laborers,” over which a well‐trained
supervisor “capable of entering into and feeling with all his heart what was involved” 102
presides, creating another echelon in the labor hierarchy and increasing the distance
between worker and finished product. In short, it severs the Chinese citizen from his
human connection to home and work. 103 This connection is replaced by love for the wall,
for the nation, for the emperor, and a general sense of unity that, in effect, turns the
plurality into a population. 104
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Arendt articulates the modern division of labor perfectly:
Since none of the activities into which the process is divided has an end in
itself, their “natural” end is exactly the same as in the case of “undivided”
labor; either the simple reproduction of the means of subsistence, that is the
capacity for consumption of the laborer, or the exhaustion of human labor
power.
What is lost is the connection the homo faber has to the object he creates. The “ignorant day
laborer” is extremely disconnected from the fruits of his activity, content to offer his
services for “good money” and thus investing no more in the wall than the means for his
own subsistence. For Kafka’s narrator this figure is of little interest, almost a given under
the conditions in which China exists – despite (or because of) the fact that this group makes
up the majority of the Chinese population. The real conundrum is the well‐educated
mason/supervisor, indoctrinated from a young age by a school system focused entirely on
the wall, who feels himself to be “a part of the wall,” 105 but will never see the product of his
labor in its entirety. For this category of worker something more than the mere subsistence
of the life process is required. “Masons of that kind, of course, had not only a desire to
perform their work in the most thorough manner, but were also impatient to see the wall
finished in its complete perfection.” 106 This impossible desire sustains the mason the way a
paycheck sustains the day laborer. It gives meaning to the supervisor’s existence.
Yet both categories of work face a similar problem: the end of the labor process, the
production of the wall or the money that results from it, is disconnected from the labor
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itself, much like the modern factory worker who handles one task that eventually leads to
something useful only after hundreds of other mundane tasks come together as if by magic.
In “The Great Wall” there is almost infinite faith in the planning, the foresight, the thought
that has gone into the building from at least “fifty years before the first stone was laid” 107
and possibly from “all eternity.” This faith is absolutely necessary to the stability of the
structure, to maintain the “ground on which we stand.” In a sense Kafka takes the logic of
the assembly line to its farthest conclusion, imagining a process wherein neither the
laborer nor the supervisor ever sees the finished product yet continues to work as if it must
exist, for to acknowledge the futility or emptiness of the task would be to give up on life
itself. In this way the means become the end, and work becomes labor.
Unlike Marx, Arendt finds no solace in work or labor as an end‐in‐itself. 108 This is
the genesis of her entire distinction. The essence of humanity in its uniqueness is its ability
to construct a history and to continuously begin something new; labor, even “free” labor,
can only recycle the life process (which means nothing in and of itself). The wall does
achieve the durability that constitutes the product of work – “the wall was to be a
protection for centuries” 109 ‐ but the vastness of the space it (supposedly) encloses makes
it useless as an object. If we insist on ascribing a use to the wall, from above as it were, it is
to provide the material conditions which promote conformism and reifies the diffuse
power of the high command; this, however, presupposes that the high command actually
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exists, a fact we cannot be too sure of: “where it was and who sat there no one whom I have
asked knew then or knows now.” 110 Nevertheless, something called “the high command”
animates the desires of the entire Chinese people, to the extent that without it “neither our
book learning nor our human understanding would have sufficed for the humble task
which we performed in the great whole.” 111
In “The Burrow,” which has often been read as an allegory of Kafka’s own struggles
as an artist, 112 the activities of the burrower are apparently motivated more by internal
processes than the external force which animates the Chinese worker. If we accept the
allegorical‐biographical reading for a moment and recall Kafka’s table‐building process, we
can see how the distinctions between labor and work get mixed up when the artistic object
is both useful and purely aesthetic, a “nothing.” Like the Great Wall, the burrow’s ostensible
use is protection and security, but it also facilitates a process that has no end, the eternal
recurrence of a life process that finds meaning in “self‐glorification.” The burrower wishes
with all his heart to detach himself from any use function the burrow might have:
One of these favorite plans of mine was to isolate the Castle Keep from its
surroundings, that is to say, to restrict the thickness of its walls to about my
own height, and leave a free space of about the same width all around the
Castle Keep, except for a narrow foundation, which unfortunately would be
left to bear up the whole. 113
In this wish, the burrower lives in a space directly outside the Castle Keep but never enters
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it; all of the labor that has gone into it, all of its use as a storage place for food, is sacrificed
for the joy of being able to “stand guard over it, and in that way to be so completely
compensated for renouncing the actual sight of it that, if one had to choose between staying
all one’s life in the Castle Keep or in the free space outside it, one would choose the latter…”
In this way the Castle Keep could become both a use‐object and a nothing, its usefulness
forever deferred and merely reveled in as a sort of abstract idea . 114 Heinrich Henel notes
that “to live all one’s life in a hollow around a hollow is the non plus ultra of the animal’s
dreams,” 115 a situation in which he can contemplate the object’s perfection without using it
up and exposing it to danger. This is always an imminent threat due to the burrower’s
uncontrollable animal instincts. Giving into his ravenous urges make for “happy but
dangerous hours,” 116 a time when he is strictly an animal laborans and risks the
worldliness of his creations as stable objects. “The Burrow” is full of these kinds of internal
antagonisms, the desire to make lasting objects and the desire to consume them, the desire
to observe and the desire to devour. The burrower knows that by using his burrow as a
home and storage facility he is sacrificing its durability as object and its perfectibility as
artwork.
This is a problem that does not arise when there are clearly demarcated spaces for
activity. The activities of animal laborans go on in the privacy of the home, while the work
of homo faber creates a durable world in which the public sphere is made possible, and
necessarily moves the individual out of the home. As Arendt notes, “without a world
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between men and nature, there is eternal movement, but no objectivity.” 117 Only by the
creation of this world can men relate to one another, and move out of the endless circle of
nature through the transformation of nature into lasting objects. “The Burrow” seems to be
a perfect description of this transformation, but the lack of any kind of public sphere denies
the burrower a place for giving expression to each kind of desire distinctly. The circular,
consumptive process that goes on in the home is conflated with the durable, lasting process
of the world, a conflation that ultimately causes the burrower to self‐destruct in a psychotic
fit of anxiety. After the introduction of the “whistling” noise that drives him to despair, the
burrower tries to eat, but it is unsatisfying: “…I spit out my food, and would like to trample
it underfoot, and go back to my task, not caring which I take up.” 118 The labor process of
gathering and eating food has become mixed up with a work process that originally aimed
to solidify the burrow’s defensive capabilities, but now has no real end besides the reflexive
exhumation of excess labor power. The burrower cannot enjoy his food because his higher
needs – security, silence, beauty – no longer have a space for expression.
Again we might draw an analogy to the modern factory worker, or even broaden it
to include every kind of “wage‐slave” trapped in a circular process whereby the fruit of
their labor (money) is used to purchase food to maintain the life process so that the worker
can go back to his job the next morning. Every activity is predicated on preventing the
destruction of the life process, and on that alone. The burrower did not always act under
these conditions; it is only when the whistling begins that he works “just as if the overseer
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had appeared and I made a pretense of working for his benefit.” 119 Previously his labor had
ostensibly been “free,” in the Marxist sense that he undertook it of his own accord and
maintained his connection to the end product throughout the process. Yet the story
reminds us again and again that this kind of labor is not really free, it is as externally
dictated as the activities of Chinese wall‐builders. He is always subject to a hostile natural
world that he himself has imagined, and thus subject to his own overwhelming fear. His
activities are reactions against this self‐made threat and often impede his happiness;
happiness is a danger that lowers his guard and opens him up to attack.
One might say that this is still freedom; after all, it is only the burrower’s raging
delusions that prevent him from being a happy and well‐adjusted individual, and he is
perfectly free to shed these delusions whenever he gathers the willpower to do so. There is
also the sense – and this is supported by the burrower himself – that if he had just worked
harder all possible contingencies could have been accounted for and complete security
achieved. 120 In short, he could give up the dream of perfect security and appreciate his
burrow for the grandiose self‐glorifying edifice that it is, or he could abandon the dream of
ever enjoying his burrow, and work on it nonstop for his entire life. It should be obvious by
now that neither possibility is open to the burrower. His nature as homo faber demands a
use‐value for his work; conversely, his concurrent nature as animal laborans requires a
continuous consumption of everything he produces. In the modern, socialized world the
specific spaces for these activities have been subsumed by each other, and we are left with
the confusion of means and ends which attends the mixing of work and labor: “instead of
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thinking only of my own defense – and how perfunctorily and vainly I have done even that
– I should have thought of the defense of the burrow.” 121
This attention to the object – apparently for the benefit of the subject – is the thread
that ties “The Burrow” and “The Great Wall of China” together. And in both cases, the
power that these objects assert over those who create them is paradigmatic of the modern
age. It is the power of conformism and socialization, explored in the previous section, and
the power of a particular kind of activity which blends work and labor into something that
alienates the worker from his product and imbues the homo faber with the circular,
consumptive concerns of the animal laborans, an activity which perverts the “worldliness”
necessary for human relations into one more utilitarian use‐value. As Arendt says, “…the
tragedy is that in the moment homo faber seems to have found fulfillment in terms of his
own activity, he begins to degrade the world of things, the end and end product of his own
mind and hands.” 122 The process, then, the means by which to achieve an end, must
become the end itself for the whole structure to function. Whether or not it has any
meaning is beside the point. In the next section we will explore how this continuous
process lends itself to the concept of historical necessity, and turns humans into passive
subjects in an inexorable process.

IV.) The Archimedean Point
Arendt begins her last chapter, “The Vita Activa and the Modern Age,” with an epigram
from Kafka:
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He found the Archimedean point, but he used it against himself; it seems he
was permitted to find it only under this condition. 123
Named after ancient Greek mathematician Archimedes, the Archimedean point is a
particular vantage, located a sufficient distance from an object to allow for a total view of
the object and its surroundings; theoretically, this perspective alone allows the observer to
see the object without bias or interference, with complete rationality. For Arendt, the
discovery of the Archimedean point was facilitated by Galileo’s invention of the telescope,
an event which is unsurpassed in its importance to modernity. “What Galileo did and what
nobody had done before was to use the telescope in such a way that the secrets of the
universe were delivered to human cognition ‘with the certainty of sense‐perception…’” 124
While the ideas which the telescope proved had been around for hundreds, if not
thousands of years, it was their observation and measurement that proved instrumental in
the end. Humanity’s newfound capability to see its world objectively displaced mankind
from his natural home and moved him out into the universe, a situation Arendt terms
“earth alienation.” But more important for our consideration is “world alienation,” the
“sudden, inexplicable eclipse of transcendence” 125 that simultaneously occurs in th modern
age. The result of this process is that men are “not thrown back upon the world but upon
themselves.” 126 In non‐Heidegarrian language, this means that humanity reduces itself to
the Cartesian cogito, denying the “real” existence of the common world and replacing it
with individualistic self‐care. The Archimedean point is drawn inward even as the scope of
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human vision exponentially expands its range. Weber, as well as Marx, cite world alienation
as the predominant condition of capitalism, “the hallmark of the modern age”: “… an
enormous, strictly mundane activity is possible without any care for or enjoyment of the
world whatever, an activity whose deepest motivation, on the contrary, is worry and care
about the self.” 127 As we’ve discussed above, it this paradoxical convergence of the inward
and outward that makes socialization possible. Humanity, turning towards itself while the
instruments it has created continue to expand the possibilities of vision, sees itself as a
mere microcosm in an enormous universe, ultimately subject to the same laws which
control the motion of the stars. Under the tenets of “ Cartesian doubt” the only truth that
can be claimed objectively is the truth of the self, namely that it exists; everything else is
fleeting, transient, perhaps illusory, certainly lacking the permanence of a stable human
world.
Kafka’s aphorism wonderfully shows the profound ambivalence with which he
viewed modernity’s progress. The idea of an uncontrollable force outside human influence
– he was “permitted” to find the Archimedean point, by what or whom we do not know –
and the self‐destructive motives of modern man are always present in Kafka’s stories, from
Joseph K.’s unbelievably passive execution for a crime he is still unaware of, to the mouse in
“A Little Fable” who keeps running through narrowing corridors and, at the end, is faced
with a trap to the front and a hungry cat to the rear. This ambivalence is further
exemplified by two more brief parables. The first is called “The Tower of Babel”; the latter,
“The Pit of Babel”:
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1.) If it had been possible to build the Tower of Babel without ascending it,
the work would have been permitted.
2.) What are you building? – I want to dig a subterranean passage. Some
progress must be made. My station up there is much too high.
We are digging the pit of Babel. 128
These two parables offer a remarkable entrance into our two stories. They could almost be
conceptualized as précis: “…the Great Wall alone would provide for the first time in the
history of mankind a secure foundation for a new Tower of Babel,” 129 the narrator says,
while the second parable might be a dialogue between the burrower and some imagined
interlocutor. The Tower of Babel, then, provides a kind of structural bond between the two
building stories, linking them to a concept of modernity that is presaged by an ancient
tradition, swept up, as it were, by the Benjaminian “angel of history” who “turns his face to
the past.” This concept, quoted by Arendt from Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of
History,” is worth citing in full:
Where we see a chain of events, he sees a single catastrophe which
unremittingly piles ruins on ruins and hurls them at his feet. He wishes he
could stay – to awaken the dead and to join together the fragments. But a
wind blows from Paradise, gets caught in his wings and is so strong that the
angel cannot close them. This wind drives him irresistibly into the future to
which he turns his back, while the pile of ruins before him towers to the
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skies. What we call progress is this wind. 130
This, as Arendt notes, is the most exact expression of Kafka’s view of progress one could
reasonably hope for. We can see this readily in “The Great Wall of China.” The structure,
designed to foster a national organization which is undoubtedly an advance from the
barbarian tribes of the north, must recall an old Biblical legend to give itself meaning, to
cast an Archimedean point into the future from which the Chinese may achieve total
harmony like Gods. In the meantime (and it is always the meantime in Kafka), we have the
fractured bits of wall, so absurdly useless both as a protection and as a foundation. The
narrator knows this: “How could the wall, which did not form even a circle, but only a sort
of quarter‐ or half‐circle, provide the foundation for a tower? That could obviously be
meant only in a spiritual sense.” 131 So why build the wall, he asks, and unwittingly answers
himself: “…for mobilizing the people’s energies for the stupendous new work?” The wall
serves to bind the people to an abstract ideal that is forever receding, utilizing their
activities (work and labor) to force conformity and allegiance to an obscure authority. The
construction process is not possible without some sense of the Archimedean point, for only
once a plurality can be considered as a population – from above – can they willingly forego
their natural attachment to home and hearth, to the familiar things which constitute their
world. The theory of the wall as foundation for the Tower of Babel – one of many “wild
ideas in people’s heads at that time” – is necessary to give some sense to the intentionally
futile aims of security. Without knowing the origins of the commands, emitted at some
point from the obscure high command, a transcendental unity is required, for “human
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nature, essentially changeable, unstable as the dust, can endure no restraint; if it binds
itself it soon begins to tear madly at its bonds, until it rends everything asunder, the wall,
the bonds, and its very self.” 132 The Chinese people are still very much in thrall to this
transcendental power, but whereas the omnipotence of a traditional God provided man
with a secure foundation to base his existence on, this new power is uncertain and
ambiguous, leaving the citizen with naught but a useless wall and a firm desire to once
touch the emperor and then to die. Thus the process must be continuous, always
progressing so as to hold the unstable bonds of human nature together.
The burrower is swept up by a similar process, but instead of building upwards
towards heaven, he digs into the ground and turns his back on the rest of the world,
directing all his concerns back in on the self. “Some progress must be made,” the parable
reads, but progress towards what? In which direction? Rather than a process which leads
towards unification and conformity, the burrower wishes to enclose himself from the
world, to cement the care of the self as the only possible concern. It is as if he wishes to
destroy the world so that only the Cartesian cogito is permitted to exist. As we’ve
discussed, the burrower’s nature as social being makes this impossible; the process is
doomed to failure by his constant need for affirmation and glorification, to the extent that
he spends much of his time imagining enemies or friends who quickly become enemies.
“The social origin of the individual ultimately reveals itself as the power to annihilate him.”
133

The innocuous fellow burrower, encountered long before in useful curiosity, has been

transformed into a destroyer: “…the burrower has changed his intention anew, he has
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turned back, he is returning from his journey, thinking he has given me ample time in the
interval to prepare for his reception.” 134 The whistling is not a coincidental development, it
is the return of a repressed memory, a specter of the past reasserting itself in its full
destructive power. “Everything forgotten mingles with what has been forgotten of the
prehistoric world, forms countless, uncertain, changing compounds, yielding a constant
flow of new, strange products.” 135 It is as if the forward movement of history brings with it
nothing but the perversion of the past, as if this movement constitutes progress. “My
station up there is much too high,” the parable goes, so a new Tower of Babel must be built
underground, finding the Archimedean point in the depths; rather than the Chinese desire
to find transcendence in the high command’s decrees, the burrower hopes to find it in
himself. As Arendt notes, this is “an attempt to reduce all experiences, with the world as
well as with other human beings, to experiences between man and himself.” 136 The
burrower’s Tower of Babel, in conjunction with the one to be built upon the Great Wall,
illustrates the dual motions of modernity, inward towards the self and outward towards
the universe.
The importance of process, illustrated here in the building process, is apparent in
Kafka’s own articulation of progress: “To believe in progress is not to believe that progress
has already taken place. That would be no belief.” 137 For Kafka, progress is always
deferred; like Benjamin’s angel of history, his characters always turn their backs on
progress, and witness only the “pile of ruins” towering up before them. This is not a choice

KCS 357
Benjamin 131
136 HC 254
137 Benjamin 130
134
135

49
so much as it is an unrelenting force, driving humanity forward in a crash course towards
ruination. Progress might be found if man could turn away from the past and look towards
his own self‐created future, but for Kafka, as for Benjamin, this is impossible. The process,
the striving for a progress which will never be achieved, leaves him with nothing but the
striving itself, a trial that is doomed to end in execution, with only the shame of it living on.
138

The swamp world’s darkness is infinite and impenetrable. Kafka made this apparent

with his testament, demanding that Brod burn all of his unpublished papers after his death.
The inevitability of failure is also confirmed by the unfinished nature of most of his mature
work: as Borges says, “Kafka did not complete his novels because it was essential that they
be incomplete.” 139 It is essential because it is the process, and not the product that matters
for modern man, for finished products are immediately subsumed by the use‐value they
possess and consumed, fading into the continuously recycled circle of consumption. “The
shift from the ‘why’ and ‘what’ to the ‘how’ implies that the actual objects of knowledge can
no longer be things or eternal motions but must be processes…” 140
Kafka understood this, and while his characters may not be able to digest the
inevitability of failure entirely, they feel its effects. Arendt also understands this, to a
degree: “…so surely the world, fabricated by men and constituted according to human and
not natural laws, will become again part of nature and will follow the law of ruin when man
decides to become himself part of nature, a blind though accurate tool of natural laws,
renouncing his supreme faculty of creating laws himself and even prescribing them to
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nature.” 141 Arendt goes astray when she reads Kafka’s works as an articulation of escape,
an expression of hope. 142 While Kafka, and his characters, never cease to struggle, they are
aware of the futility of this battle, and in the end they always succumb to the prescribed
endpoint of progress – that is, failure. Here we might recall Camus’ essay in the Myth of
Sisyphus, in which he declares the works of Kafka to lack the true quality of the absurd,
precisely because they contain hope. At the “vehement proceedings Kafka institutes against
the whole universe… His unbelievable verdict is this hideous and upsetting world in which
the very moles dare to hope.” 143 This hope stems from the fact that they “embrace the God
that consumes them,” and through this embrace “the absurd is recognized, accepted, and
man is resigned to it , but from then on we know that it has ceased to be the absurd.” 144 For
Camus, following the vastly influential reading of Kafka by Brod, the motivation of the
stories is religious, and where there is a God – even if it is a deus absconditus, a God who has
turned his back on humanity – there is hope. The truly absurd work denies the existence of
God and places man in a world with no recourse.
Camus’ point is well‐taken, but Kafka’s God, I would argue, is thoroughly grounded
in fragile human experience, subject to the same irrevocable forces as the population. This
is no traditional God, guiding mankind and judging him omnisciently. Recall the “nature
Gods” the Chinese worship in the home, a rite of prayer which is as scrutinized by the high
command as the wall‐building. Kafka’s God offers no hope: “our world is only a bad mood
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of God, a bad day of his.” 145 This is a thoroughly modern God, one who has abandoned his
world to the laws of history, or at least subjected himself to them. The high command and
the whistling entity both take the form of this inhuman law. We may wish to know them, to
feel them or to be certain of their makeup, but we can only react to their residues. “I have
reached the stage where I no longer wish to have certainty,” 146 the burrower says after a
long and arduous effort to discover the source of the whistling; he is now content to accept
it for what it is, an incomprehensible mystery, and to subject himself to its inevitability.
Likewise the narrator of “The Great Wall” cuts off his inquiry at the point where it might
undermine the Chinese people’s sense of assurance, not daring to peer into the nothingness
at the heart of the high command. He approaches this point when he considers the “existent
Emperor, a man like us, [who] lies much like us on a couch which is of generous
proportions, perhaps, and yet very possibly may be quite narrow and short.” 147 That “yet”
contains a galaxy of meaning, the promise of a doubt which might tear the whole structure
down and relieve the Chinese of their persistent hope for the emperor’s touch, their trust in
an opaque authority, and reassert their own collective agency. But it is still too vague, too
distant: “But how should we know anything about that – thousands of miles away in the
south – almost on the borders of the Tibetan Highlands? And besides, any tidings, even if
they did reach us, would arrive far too late, would have become obsolete long before they
reached us.” 148 The vast landscape of China does not allow for truth. The burrower, with
his Archimedean point progressing endlessly inward, cannot receive it either. The image
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here is that of a beam of light, racing towards an object across an expanding universe that
recedes from the beam at an impossibly fast rate, while the inquisitive subject cannot see
beyond the cosmic walls that enclose him.
This metaphor is not used indiscriminately. Kafka’s world is uncannily similar to the
one described by physics, without ever resorting to the symbolic language of mathematics.
“The modern astrophysical world view,” Arendt writes, “and its challenge to the adequacy
of the senses to reveal reality, have left us with a universe of whose qualities we know no
more than the way they affect our measuring instruments, and – in the words of Eddington
– ‘the former have as much resemblance to the latter as a telephone number has to a
subscriber.’” 149 Benjamin also cites a passage from Eddington’s The Nature of the Physical
World, an excerpt which he claims “bears the Kafka stamp” more clearly than any in
literature:
I am standing on the threshold about to enter a room. It is a complicated
business. In the first place I must shove against an atmosphere with a force of
fourteen pounds on every square inch of my body. I must make sure of
landing on a plank traveling at twenty miles a second around the sun – a
fraction of a second too early or too late, the plank would be miles away. I
must do this whilst hanging from a round planet head outward into space,
and with a wind of aether blowing at no one knows how many miles a second
through every interstice of my body. The plank has no solidity of substance.
To step on it is like stepping on a swarm of flies. Shall I not slip through? No,
if I make the venture one of the flies hits me and gives a boost up again; I fall
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again and am knocked upward by another fly; and so on. I may hope that the
net result will be that I remain about steady; but if unfortunately I should slip
through the floor or be boosted too violently up to the ceiling, the occurrence
would be, not a violation of the laws of Nature, but a rare coincidence.
Verily, it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a
scientific man to pass through a door. 150
Kafka’s men (and his animals) are the same scientific beings Eddington describes. For
them, the most quotidian and arbitrary tasks of daily life take on a difficulty of Olympic
proportions. In a different short story, Poseidon is assigned the endless, tedious work of
“administration of all the waters,” a task he does not like but must fulfill because it is “very
difficult to find him another job.” 151 In Kafka’s world, the great Greek deity has become a
functionary. So it goes both ways; the quotidian is elevated to the Godlike, and the Godlike
diminished to the mundane labor of the clerk. In a modern world where true descriptions
must take the form of cold, impersonal calculations, and the same rules apply to the both
atoms in the stomach and atoms in a star, everything is experienced as a well‐oiled
machine and the human subject is a mere cog in its precise movements. The Chinese
people, educated in masonry and that alone, must view their world through the wall
because only through the wall can variegated human experience become reified and
comprehensible. “… the building of the wall in particular, with its abundance of human
material, provided a man of sensibility with the opportunity of traversing the souls of
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almost all the provinces…” 152 “Human material”; this kind of formulation is only possible in
the modern world. The burrower also, convinced that it is only through negligence and a
poor work‐ethic that perfect security has not been achieved, views the world as a machine,
one which only needs endless fine‐tuning to function flawlessly. He operates like
Eddington’s “scientific man,” unable to act due to the overwhelming complexity of forces
stacked against him. If he does manage to act it is because he momentarily loses himself:
“And then, too exhausted to be any longer capable of thought, my head hanging, my legs
trembling with fatigue, half asleep, feeling my way rather than walking, I approach the
entrance…” 153 Whether passing through a door or re‐entering a burrow, action really only
requires thoughtlessness, for to consider the full implications of such a monumental task is
impossible. And a thoughtless act is no different than the action of a machine.
Kafka’s scientific characters also experience the modern distortion of space and
time, in a very strange and real way. In “A Common Confusion” two characters try to set up
a meeting, but always pass each other in transit; one leg of the journey takes ten minutes,
the next day the same journey takes ten hours, and the next it takes ten seconds. At the end
of it all, on the verge of finally meeting, one character twists his ankle and writhes in pain
on the floor, while the other tromps past him “in a violent rage” and “vanish[es] for good.”
154 Arendt

considers this story “the model of confusion itself,” 155 and if we’re willing to get a

little abstract, it’s the kind of confusion one encounters everywhere in a world governed by
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Einstein’s laws of relativity. 156 The monumental impact of Einstein’s discovery (which was
only verified thanks to the telescope) on modernity is well‐documented. Everywhere the
implication of relativism, in physical as well as moral or epistemological spheres, has made
itself felt. One of Kafka’s most singular achievements was to take these effects and
concretize them, to make them felt rather than just known. Adorno claims Kafka “studies
what would happen if the results of psychoanalysis were to prove true not merely
metaphorically but in the flesh;” 157 we could easily replace “psychoanalysis” with “physics”
without losing the glimmer of truth. While normal men go through doorways, build homes,
and follow orders all the time, Kafka shows us just how unbelievably complex, and – one is
tempted to say – impossible these tasks really are in the modern world. In the parable “An
Imperial Message,” placed near the end of “The Great Wall,” the emperor’s messenger
travels with a message “to you, the humble subject, the insignificant shadow cowering in
the remotest distance before the imperial sun.” 158 Yet no matter how fast he runs, how
easily the way is cleared for him, he is unable to leave the “chambers of the innermost
palace,” “nobody could fight his way through here even with a message from a dead man.”
159

In astrophysical terms, the villager who dreams of the message at his window is the

edge of the universe, the ultimate limit of man’s sensory capabilities, racing away from the
space it encloses faster than the speed of light.
How can one gain access to truth in such a world? The uncomfortable fact of the
matter is that, in the modern world, truth is no longer a universal prospect. Arendt quotes
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Werner Heisenberg, the scientist who discovered the Uncertainty Principle: “Man in his
hunt for ‘objective reality’ suddenly discovered that he always ‘confronts himself alone.’”
160

By finding the inherent limitations in man’s acquisition of knowledge, Heisenberg

stands with Einstein at the vanguard of the modern age. 161 The impossibility of truly
objective information does not decrease man’s desire for it, hence the persistent dream of
finding the Archimedean point, of overcoming the limitations and gaining certainty. Arendt
and Heisenberg recognize that this desire inevitably leads back in towards the self, and it is
here that “the humanist’s concern with man and the stature of man has caught up with the
scientist.” 162 Kafka, who was no scientist, 163 saw the convergence and articulated it with
unsurpassed precision. The burrower is just one of the characters who recognizes the
limits of what he can know, but the insight comes too late. Beset by his worst fear, an
enemy who has no definite location and seems to emanate from everywhere at once, he
finally understands that certainty brings no comfort; 164 prior to this, his every activity is
motivated by the desire to know and control everything. “But if my hypothesis does not
meet the case, what can the explanation be?” 165 This is an exclusively modern question, as
Arendt knows: “scientists formulate their hypotheses to arrange their experiments and
then use these experiments to verify their hypotheses; during this whole enterprise, they
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obviously deal with a hypothetical nature.” 166 What’s lost in this circular endeavor is any
sense of a common world, interwoven through each person’s connection to man‐made
things and every other human being. The burrower’s insistence on testing his reality
through endless experiments obviously does not require the presence of others, because
his “truth” is situated somewhere within the private circle of the hypothesis‐reality
framework. For the Chinese wall‐builders truth is somewhere “out there,” at the top of a
Tower of Babel which man will not be permitted to ascend, while their only connection to
the world itself – the Great Wall – is sensible solely from this Archimedean point. Again, the
loss of a common world is manifest in this kind of “reality.” For the Chinese no less than the
burrower the sense of reality comes from within, from an individual sense which fails to
extend its perceptive circle beyond the individual mind and body.
For common sense, which once had been the one by which all other senses,
with their intimately private sensations, were fitted into the common world,
just as vision fitted man into the visible world, now became an inner faculty
without any world relationship. 167
To return to Kafka’s notion of progress (or lack thereof) in the modern world, we
may finally note that this Archimedean point, simultaneously extending out into the
universe and back in towards the subject, is used against us by precisely this elimination of
the common, public world. Arendt notes that the historical genesis of modernity, the
French Revolution, began with the promise of just this kind of world. The French public
post‐1789 had become ‘challengers,’ had taken the initiative upon themselves and

166
167

HC 287
HC 283

58
therefore, without knowing or even noticing it, had begun to create the public space
between themselves where freedom could appear.” 168 This dream, however, quickly and
emphatically faded, and what was left was a world without tradition or memory, stuck in
between a past composed of ruins and a future that seemed to follow inhuman laws.
Freedom had lived briefly and brightly, but with its disappearance there went the
possibility of meaningful action. Arendt quotes Tocqueville: “Since the past has ceased to
throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity.” 169
Arendt uses Kafka’s parable “He” to expand upon Tocqueville:
He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind, from the origin.
The second blocks the road ahead. He gives battle to both. To be sure, the
first supports him in his fight with the second, for he wants to push him
forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with the
first, since he drives him back. But it is only theoretically so. For it is not only
the two antagonists who are there, but he himself as well, and who really
know his intentions? His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded
moment – and this would require a night darker than any night has ever been
yet – he will jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, on account of his
experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over his antagonists in their
fight with each other. 170
What is most notable here is the dream, to remove oneself from the battling forces of
history and to observe them objectively. Obviously what he desires is the Archimedean
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point. One could imagine Benjamin’s angel of history with a similar wish, to once close his
wings and feel the winds subside. But of course this, like the dream of perfect security and
the emperor’s message, is only a dream. The opposing historical forces have him firmly
ensconced in a battle which effectively cancels itself out, holding the subject in a state of
suspension. Everything we have discussed up to this point – the conflation of public and
private, labor and work, the dream of the Archimedean point, operates along an invisible
trajectory towards this goal. The result is a humanity composed of automatons, going
through the requisite process of living and then dying of exhaustion, like K. in The Castle or
Gregor Samsa in The Metamorphosis. Arendt sees a lesson in Kafka’s parable, an
exhortation towards thinking; only through the application of “thinking what we do” can
we find a “diagonal line” which leads us to “the place in time which is sufficiently removed
from past and future to offer ‘the umpire’ a position from which to judge the forces fighting
with each other with an impartial eye.” 171
In other words, there is a hope, and while it will require the most strenuous thought
we can muster, it can lead us out of the impasse. While Arendt doesn’t claim Kafka’s shares
her conviction, I believe she fails to understand him. Benjamin, on the other hand, is more
faithful to the text. Once he was certain of eventual failure, everything worked out for him
en route as in a dream.” 172 Kafka, unlike Arendt, accepts failure and works under its
conditions, with the profound understanding that this is really the only way to work. It is
not all morbid pessimism, however, for somewhere in this endless struggle little spaces for
happiness, humor, and serenity open up. But the human, and the human condition, seems
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unalterably doomed. The implications of Kafka’s worldview, as both Arendt and Benjamin
knew, would soon make themselves felt in reality: “Kafka’s world, frequently of such
playfulness and interlaced with angels, is the exact complement of his era which is
preparing to do away with the inhabitants of this planet on a considerable scale.” 173
Benjamin, who did not live to see the full horrors of the Holocaust, is referencing World
War 1, but the “progress” made from former to latter is endemic of modernity. This is what
Arendt means by claiming Kafka as a builder of “blueprints”: he recognized that certain
conditions could lead only to endless repetition, an eternal recurrence from which no
escape is possible. In the office of the high command “one may be certain that all human
thoughts and desires revolved in a circle, and all human aims and fulfillments revolved in a
countercircle. And through the window the reflected splendors of divine worlds fell on the
hands of the leaders as they traced their plans.” 174 All thought is already stuck in the circle,
already assimilated into the impenetrable decrees of an ethereal authority. “…in absolute
subjective space and absolute subjective time there is no room for anything that might
disturb their intrinsic principle, that of inexorable estrangement,” 175 Adorno writes. The
absolute and the inexorable; the subjective and the estranged. These seemingly
contradictory terms are in some ways the operative terms of the modern age, the walls
over which the modern human cannot see. The Archimedean point offers a ladder rising
above the fray, but one can never climb it quickly enough. Yet he tries and tries again, and
this trial is, for Kafka, the zero‐sum of modern existence.
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